This paper examines bequest motives by evaluating participation patterns in micro life insurance against the predictions of a theoretical framework on the demand for life insurance and in relation to additional supply side factors. On household survey data from Sri Lanka, it presents evidence on the determinants of micro life insurance participation of low-income households using probit and tobit models. The results provide evidence that micro life insurance is positively correlated with measures of bequest motives, like number of children or dependents. In addition, better off households are less excluded from life insurance markets than their poorer counterparts; thus, access to micro life insurance is still limited for the poor. It appears that participation patterns go beyond the propositions of the theoretical framework; for instance, the outcome underlines the fact that the religious inclination of the underlying sample is associated with participation in micro life insurance schemes.
Introduction
In developing countries microinsurance has become a rising star, as it is increasingly recognized as an integral element of poverty reduction strategies. Due to limited resources, the adverse effects of unexpected events have a significant effect on the income of the poor, so it is hard for them to recover from these. A high potential for microinsurance is identified as a measure to reduce the vulnerabilities of low-income groups. However, many low-income households do not have the ability to use ex ante preventive risk management strategies or rely on informal mechanisms providing only partial insurance, so that they lack sufficient options to secure against hazards (Loewe et al. 2001 , Cohen et al. 2005 , McCord et al. 2006 ).
Shocks to a household's income, such as the death or illness of a household member, generate movements in consumption for households that are not perfectly insured against such risks, and, in the most extreme cases, may lead to famine or death. In the case of such family related shocks, microinsurance functions directly as a risk coping mechanism incorporating measures for consumption smoothing. After a sudden drop in income due to a recently experienced serious crisis, a household would be expected to be less likely to take up insurance. However, in a long-term perspective, we assume that the experi-ence of a serious event in the near past induces the household to buy insurance to prevent any such recurrence. At the same time, it is clear that insurance is only one of many possible ways of reducing the impact of risk on poverty. In fact, other financial services may be beneficial as well, i.e. flexible savings products or a variety of credit options.
While other types of insurance are also relevant for the low-income market, we focus on the risk of death, which is frequently identified -along with illness -as the most severe hazard in demand research. A study of "The Landscape of Microinsurance in the World's 100 Poorest Countries" identifies life insurance as the most widely provided microinsurance policy in the world (Roth et al. 2007) 55 . Life insurance policies are financial products that mainly consist of two different components: income replacement in the event of premature death, and a long-term savings instrument. Therefore, life insurance encourages long-term savings and the reinvestment of substantial sums in private and public sector projects, and has taken on increasing importance as a way for households to manage income risks. Furthermore, the idea of life insurance is greatly welcomed by clients, supplanting private efforts to insure against loss by joining informal burial societies that pool resources and pay out to participants in the event of a loss.
Nevertheless, the debate on the demand for formal insurance in developing countries is rarely spread in the literature except for various studies on informal insurance (Townsend 1995 , Morduch 1995 , 1999 , Dercon 2002 , Churchill 2006 ). However, a few studies exist which use quantitative data from household surveys to identify and analyse the determinants of insurance participation (Asfaw 2003 , Jütting 2003 , Bhat and Jain 2006 , Giné et al. 2008 , Cole et al. 2009 , Giné and Yang 2009 , Ito and Kono 2010 . It is the aim of this paper to add to these contributions on the cross-sectional determinants of microinsurance participation of low-income households, using comprehensive household survey data from Sri Lanka. Our approach is different from these discussions in the following way.
First, we assess -similarly to Essay 1 for Ghana -the participation in micro life insurance schemes in Sri Lanka, as there are so far mainly contributions on weather, crop or health insurance. Second, the paper is the first to evaluate micro life insurance participation patterns against a benchmark theoretical 55 Life insurance is the easiest microinsurance to provide due to certain characteristics, e.g. relatively easy to price, but health insurance is demanded the most. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Even though life insurance has been most successful to date, in particular credit life insurance, health insurance plans are being tried, as well as property and crop insurance in Sri Lanka.
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access model, developed by Lewis (1989) , on the demand for life insurance. By doing so, we aim to analyse whether micro life insurance participation is motivatedbesides other determinants -by the desire to leave bequests. The benchmark model suggests that life insurance participation increases with the probability of a wage earner's death, the present value of the beneficiaries' consumption and the degree of risk aversion 56 . If the household values bequest behaviour, we argue that the present value of the beneficiaries' consumption increases with the number of dependents, i.e. micro life insurance participation increases with the number of dependents. Modelling pure term life insurances and combinations of term life insurance and savings plans, we derive bequests using a "joy-ofgiving" motive. We argue that bequests can be either intended (desired) (Hurd 1987) , altruistic (Tomes 1982) , strategic due to self-interested exchange with one's heirs (Bernheim et al. 1985) or unintended (accidental) (Hurd 1994) .
Third, we estimate the determinants for micro life insurance participation by using the actual use of micro life insurance and respective premium amounts as dependent variables in probit and tobit models. The actual use of insurance, i.e. the actual provision, is determined by the supply and demand of insurance (World Bank 2008) 57 , so that we control for the access to life insurance in Sri Lanka by identifying the socioeconomic characteristics of the life insurance user and non-user. Premium expenditure has typically been used as the measure of insurance consumption and coverage in previous research in developed country contexts (Burnett and Palmer 1984 , Truett and Truett 1990 , Browne and Kim 1993 . Premium data do not allow us to observe the actual amount of insurance coverage purchased, as the premium amount is a combined measure of price and level of coverage. Nevertheless, it gives us an indication of insurance coverage, so that the combined usage enables us to control for a more holistic picture of insurance participation, including both the insurance ownership and coverage (Beck and Webb 2002) . 56 Furthermore, the theoretical framework suggests that life insurance participation and premiums increase with the household's income and education level, whereas they decrease with the policy loading factor and the household's wealth. 57 Users of insurance can be distinguished from non-users. Among the non-users are those who voluntarily exclude themselves from the use of insurance, such as households which do not use insurance due to cultural or religious reasons, and households who do not need or want to use insurance. The other group are the involuntarily excluded households who demand insurance, but do not have access to it because of insufficient income or high risk, discrimination due to social, religious, or ethnic grounds, restrictive contractual and informational frameworks, too high prices or inappropriate product features offered by the providers (World Bank 2008).
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Our main findings are as follows. Micro life insurance is strongly related to indicators of intentional bequest motives. The results provide evidence that lowincome households purchase micro life insurances to be secure in the event of the premature death of the main breadwinner. Beyond that, there are a pair of results that closely support standard findings of insurance participation. Micro life insurance is not yet able to reach the poorest households in Sri Lanka. Interestingly, religious inclination is associated with the participation in micro life insurance schemes.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 describes the microinsurance market, specific life insurance contract features and institutional details in Sri Lanka. Section 3.3 discusses theoretical determinants of life insurance participation, and sets out hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.4 outlines our survey and the methods used in the estimation. The descriptive statistics and the results of the estimations are discussed in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes.
The Microinsurance Sector and the Role of Life insurance in Sri Lanka
Even though insurance markets are growing all over the world and in particular in developing countries, commercial insurance services are still negligible among low-income households. As part of this growth, the high potential of the microinsurance markets is increasingly recognized, not only as an important integral to reduce the vulnerabilities of the poor, but also as an emerging insurance market sector and a contributor to economic growth 58 . However, the global outreach of microinsurance is limited, so that more insight is needed into why the uptake of microinsurance among the poor is still low.
Similar to several South Asian and developing countries, Sri Lanka has, on the whole, an infant microinsurance market in terms of penetration 59 2006) . 59 Insurance penetration is defined as the amount of the total insurance premiums expressed as a percentage of the national GDP and thus, measures the level of risk awareness of the population and the significance of insurance in the economy. 60 During the last three years, the average penetration of life insurance has ranged between 1.4 to 1.6 percent in Sri Lanka (ADB 2006) . 61 Insurance density indicates how much each inhabitant of a country spends each year on insurance services and so is a measure of the maturity of the industry in the economy.
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access terms of density (Rajivan 2007) . It is plausible that the low penetration and density, indicating limited access to and provision of insurance, might be one explanation for the as yet low outreach of insurance in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, Roth et al. (2007) suggest that there will be a significant increase of microinsurance provision in the next few years due to three major reasons: the large interest of insurers in the low-income market, the significant demand for risk management strategies in low-income households, and strong efforts by potential intermediaries to offer microinsurance. In Sri Lanka the origin of microinsurance schemes was in funeral aid society concepts, which provided assistance to the member and family in the case of death of a family member. In 1991, the All Lanka Mutual Assurance Organization 62 (ALMAO), one of the apex microinsurance schemes, was started by seven cooperating Funeral Aid Societies (FASs). Although 14 private insurance companies and 45 insurance brokers are registered and regulated under the Insurance Board of Sri Lanka (IBSL), unregulated organizations, like mutuals, and NGOs such as YASIRU and SEEDS, dominate the microinsurance market by offering the majority of products, mainly micro life insurance, particularly in rural areas (Enarsson and Wirén 2006, Roth et al. 2007) .
Micro life insurance is the most widely provided microinsurance policy in the world; however, only 67.2 million people are so far covered in Asia (Roth et al. 2007) . A number of characteristics of the life insurance business have been identified as the foremost reasons for this fact: the most demanded forms of cover relate to the importance of family related serious events, are easy to price, resistant to problems of fraud and moral hazard, and are independent of other forms of infrastructure like health facilities in the case of health insurance.
Generally speaking, life insurance as well as micro life insurance can offer two services: income replacement for premature death and a long-term savings instrument (Black and Skipper 2000, Beck and Webb 2002 to the policy owner. Additionally, these forms of insurance earn interest, which is returned to the consumer through policy dividends, cash on termination of the policy, or endowment sums on maturation of the policy (Black and Skipper  2000) . Even though micro life insurances have the highest outreach of the microinsurance provision in Sri Lanka, life insurance faces a dilemma, which might be another reason for the generally low uptake of microinsurance. It appears that there is public apathy to contract life insurance, because high inflation rates have reduced the maturity value of term life insurance policies in the past. Nevertheless, there exist several microinsurance products offering death benefits, which can be viewed as a form of term life insurance, and which provide a wide variety of other schemes like accident, hospitalization, health and other benefits 65 . In the household data set used here, the predominant micro life insurance product is a term life insurance providing only mortality coverage, mainly for the policy owner. We suggest that the remaining micro life insurances can be understood as cash value policies incorporating not only substantial amounts of mortality coverage, but variable savings components as well.
However, major differences are observed in terms of premium, benefits value, duration of membership, age at entry, or in terms of the number of clients covered by a micro life insurance policy. However, except for three types of life microinsurance policies -Sithumina, Divithura and Pilsarana, offered by the SANASA -all other policies cover the family members as well. The WDBF and the WDF for instance, treat the whole family as the policy holder, so that the premiums vary depending on the benefits included, but not on the number of family members covered.
Modelling Life Insurance Uptake -A Conceptual Review

Theoretical Framework of the Demand for Life Insurance
Nearly all theoretical work on the demand for life insurance takes Yaari (1965) as a starting point, followed by the work of Hakansson (1969) . In the context of a life-cycle model with uncertain lifetime, Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969) presented the first theoretical framework to explain the demand for life insurance. Both assume that an individual can enhance his lifetime utility by purchasing a life insurance policy and leave, as a portion of his income, a bequest sum for dependents. By examining bequest motives in considerable detail, Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969) find that the demand for life insurance is related to the person's desire to leave funds to dependents and/or provide income for retirement. In detail, Yaari's framework suggests that a consumer purchases life insurance to increase his expected lifetime utility, as follows:
(1) where in (1) is the instantaneous utility from consumption in present value, and (.) α and (.) β are the discount factors. Casually observed, (.) β rises when consumers get married or have offspring, as these events account for much of the change in life insurance ownership (Yaari 1965) . Concerning the relationship in (1), fluctuations in the demand for life insurance depend mainly on exogenous shifts in the consumer's utility function. Within the models of Yaari (1965) and Hankansson (1969) , the consumer maximizes lifetime utility subject to a vector of interest rates and a vector of prices including insurance premium rates, so that the demand for life insurance is a function of wealth, expected income over an individual's lifetime, the level of interest rates, and the cost of life insurance policies 66 . Based on these models, Lewis (1989) was the first who explicitly included the preferences of the dependents and beneficiaries in a model, in order to extend the theoretical framework beyond previous work 67 . This benchmark model guides our analysis. If applicable, we will modify its predictions and add some predictions, including more demand-and supply-side factors, and will compare our example taken from a developing country perspective with it.
As an extension of Yaari (1965) and Hakansson (1969) , the benchmark model suggests the demand for life insurance not only as a maximization of the consumer lifetime utility, but also as a maximization problem of the beneficiaries, spouse and offspring of the life insurance policy holder. Consistent with the life insurance literature, it appears that life insurance should be purchased to satisfy the needs of survivors. The above mentioned exogenous shifts of the consumer's utility function are now assumed to be at least partly endogenous by incorporating the preferences of the beneficiaries (Lewis 1989). Life insurance premiums can be also regarded as payments made by parents on behalf on their offspring, and, in that sense, are equivalent to expenditures on children's clothing or other commodities provided by the parents to the offspring. Lewis (1989) derives utility maximization by spouse and offspring separately by assuming no inheritance from the policy holder, and by assuming an isoelastic utility function. Total life insurances taken up on the husband's life is simply the sum of the purchases by the wife and each offspring. It is assumed that each household member has the same degree of relative risk aversion and it is noted that the non-negativity constraint on life insurance holdings is binding on all or none of the household members. Following Lewis (1989) , life insurance demand can be written as follows:
where in (2) l is the policy loading factor, i.e. the ratio of the costs of the insurance to its actuarial value, p is the probability of the primary wage earner's death, F the face value of all life insurance written on the primary wage earner's life, į the measure of the beneficiaries' relative risk aversion, TC the present value of consumption of each offspring until he/she leaves the household and of the spouse over his/her predicted remaining life time, and W the household's net wealth 68 . From the interrelationship in (2), the following proposition can be derived:
Proposition 1: Life insurance participation increases with the probability of the breadwinner's death, the present value of the beneficiaries' consumption and the degree of risk aversion, whereas it decreases with the loading factor and the household's wealth.
The Lewis model suggests that, if the present value of consumption of the beneficiaries increases, the demand for life insurance increases as well. As the present value of consumption of the beneficiaries is positively related to the number of dependents, and as life insurance provides dependents with payments in the case of the premature death of the household head (primary income earner), we argue that life insurance participation increases with the number of dependents of a policy holder or in a household which values bequests behaviour. Therefore, it could be that a higher number of young dependents, i.e. children, increases the demand for mortality coverage and decreases the demand for savings through life insurance. As young dependents emphasize precautionary motives, they may be considered to be too young to save for retirement and reduce demand for savings through life insurance. For instance, the ratio of dependents to the total working population is expected to influence the demand for life insurance, especially the mortality coverage (Browne and Kim 1993, Beck and Webb 2002) 69 . We furthermore assume that a higher number of old dependents decreases the demand for mortality coverage and increases the demand for savings through life insurance. It is important to note that the strength and the type of the bequest motive varies over lifetime, i.e. the bequest motive decreases and the saving motive increases with increasing age, whereas the bequest motive is at its peak at the prime age of the policy holder.
Proposition 2: Life insurance participation increases with the number of dependents in the household, whereas a higher number of young dependents increases the demand for mortality coverage and a higher number of old dependents decreases the demand for savings through life insurance.
Besides the presence and number of children, several contributions claim that a bequest motive may result from being married (Bernheim et al. 2003 , Inkmann et al. 2009 ). In principle, uncertain time for life, altruism, and strategic behaviour towards heirs are the three main identified reasons for making bequests. Involuntary bequests may occur depending on uncertain lifetimes and incomplete insurance markets, so uninsured risks relating to health and longevity may give rise to precautionary motives for preserving wealth in old age (Vidal-Meliá and Lejárraga-Garcia 2005) . In contrast to an egoistic 70 bequest motive, the altruistic motive is motivated by the utility of the recipient, i.e. the policy holder simply wants to leave a bequest to his family (Tomes 1982 , Bernheim 1991 , whereas the strategic motive is motivated by the desire to manipulate the behaviour of the recipient, i.e. to give an incentive to look after the policy holder in his old age by promising a bequest in return (Bernheim et al. 1985) . Our case includes information on term life, but as well on cash value insurances, although we expect that in the latter savings motives play a larger role than precautionary motives. While term life insurance is strongly related to precautionary motives, i.e. the existence of bequest motives (Inkmann and Michaelides 2010), we focus on the precautionary motives, as term life insurances predominate in our data source. 69 Beck and Webb (2002) derive different further variables determining the demand for life insurance that may be related or based on the demand function described by Lewis (1989) . They present variables not only on the individual (or household) level, but as well on the institutional and macroeconomic level, which we do not discuss in detail here or, if applicable, we attempt to link to the household instead country level. 70 The bequest motive can be egoistic in that it can be generated purely by a desire to have positive net worth upon death.
The benchmark model predicts that the willingness to pay for security fundamentally depends on the degree of risk aversion of the household. Arrow (1965) and Pratt (1964) find the commonly well-accepted hypothesis that the absolute risk aversion decreases with the increasing wealth of an individual. In a developed country context, there is evidence that individuals without life insurance are significantly less risk averse than their counterparts with life insurance, whereas the risk aversion increases with the income and wealth up to a mean of the respective distribution, and then decreases (Barsky et al. 1997 ). This indicates a life-cycle effect of the degree of an individual's risk aversion, whereas the latter decreases after a certain amount of wealth, income or age. It is plausible to suggest that better off households have a better ability and willingness to bear a given amount of risk compared to relatively poor households. As the poor are too close to subsistence in developing countries, a given loss can be ruinous for them, so that they are most risk averse (Ray 1999). Thus, we suggest a positive association between the uptake of life insurance and the degree of risk aversion in Sri Lanka.
Beyond this model's prediction is the possibility that religious inclination may affect the uptake of life insurance, as the degree of risk aversion and the attitude towards life insurance depend highly on the country's culture and the predominant religion (Browne and Kim 1993) 71 . In several Islamic countries, life insurance has been traditionally disapproved of, as it is seen as a hedge against the will of Allah (Beck and Webb 2002). In Sri Lanka, the predominant religion is Buddhist, followed by Islam, Hindu and Christians 72 . As there are no Islamic households in our data set, we neglect expectations due to Islamic inclination here. We employ a broader measure of religious inclination, which includes the other three prevalent religious beliefs. As so far there exist no contributions on the effect of religious differences on insurance participation for these groups, we do not have prior expectations about the effects the religious correlates.
71 Historically, religion has been a strong source of cultural opposition to life insurance, as uptake of life insurance relies on a distrust of God's protecting care (Zelizer 1979 In principle, education may have an effect of increasing the time period of dependency, which may increase the demand for mortality coverage, so that a higher level of education is assumed to be positively correlated with the use of life insurance (Beck and Webb 2002) . It could be, that, on the one hand, it may raise the ability to understand the benefits of risk management and savings, but on the other hand, it may also increase the individual's risk aversion, which would be reflected by a lower į in the Lewis model (Beck and Webb 2002) . We argue that life insurance participation may increase with the level of income, due to increasing consumption and human capital, i.e. this creates a higher demand for mortality coverage in order to preserve the income and consumption of household head and dependents. This has been shown by using individual household data for both developed and developing countries by Lewis (1989) , Truett and Truett (1990) , Browne and Kim (1993) and Outreville (1996) . However, it is plausible that there may exist an opposite effect, as poor households are more risk averse than better off ones, and thus are more in need of life insurance. We control for this possibility in our estimations.
Proposition 4: Life insurance participation increases with the household's income and education level.
Represented by the policy loading factor in the model, supply side factors affect the cost of life insurance products and the consumption of life insurance (Beck and Webb 2002) . First, the investment function of life insurers is facilitated by an adequate protection of property rights and an effective enforcement of contracts. Second, the insurer is in need of adequate human and information resources for effective pricing measurement, for the reservation of product requirements, as well as for adequate investment opportunities in the financial market. Both directly influence the costs of life insurance products for the insurer. Third, it is obvious that many households remain uninsured against significant income risks due to various reasons; thus, adverse selection and moral hazard are largely considered as potential explanations for barriers to insurance participation (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, Cawley and Phillipson 1999) .
Contrary to the separating equilibrium in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976), Cawley and Philipson (1999) note that, conditional on observables, life insurance premia decrease in the quantity of insurance purchased. Models of adverse selection and moral hazard are applicable to the life insurance contracts studied here. In practice, life expectancy is public information, but the individual's health status, life expectancy and accident probability are not totally observable by the insurance provider or, if so, only with a high investment in time, costs
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access and human resources. Thus, we argue that the insurance providing institution cannot fully determine whether an individual is at high or low risk of death, so that adverse selection may occur in the life insurance market. Ito and Kono (2010) find some evidence of the existence of adverse selection in micro health insurance provision in India, as households having a higher ratio of sick members are more likely to purchase microinsurance, which leads to practical problems in insurance participation. Theoretically, moral hazard may exist as well in the context of life insurance markets, this being the case if the household may live with less caution and risk more after contracting insurance.
Empirical Findings on Insurance Participation from Developing Countries
Differing from the benchmark model of life insurance, we add here empirical evidence on non-life insurance participation, namely health or rainfall insurance, in order to derive additional expectations on participation patterns from a developing country context. As many low-income households do not have the ability to use ex ante preventive risk management strategies or lack sufficient options to secure against hazards, numerous studies point out that there exists high potential for (micro)insurance in developing countries (Loewe et al. 2001 , Cohen et al. 2005 , McCord et al. 2006 . However, there are, to our knowledge, so far only a few studies using quantitative data from household surveys to identify and analyse determinants of the usage of formal insurance (Asfaw 2003 , Jütting 2003 , Bhat and Jain 2006 , Giné et al. 2008 , Cole et al. 2009 , Giné and Yang 2009 , Ito and Kono 2010 . All studies emphasize the impact of various demographic household characteristics and the risk exposure of the household. Empirical evidence has shown that a household is more likely to contract insurance with its increasing income and expected loss payments (Jütting 2003 , Pauly 2004 , Bhat and Jain 2006 , Giné et al. 2008 . In contrast to developed countries, Giné et al. (2008) find that risk averse households are less likely to purchase insurance due to supply side constraints, i.e. the risk averse low-income households do not have access to insurance. Furthermore, households with a higher risk exposure or which feel more exposed to risk have a lower probability of participating in micro life insurance (Essay 1 for Ghana, Section 1.7); nevertheless, Essay 2 for Sri Lanka (Section 2.7.2) shows the opposite, as here the households are more likely to use a more diversified set of financial serivces. The two prior findings reflect the uncertainty about the offered product itself and especially the lack of understanding of the insurance concept and the mechanism behind insurance (McCord 2001 , Chankova et al. 2008 . It is possible that it depends on the reliability of the providing institution and its educational efforts, whether households view insurance as a risky option for them.
An often identified barrier in the distribution of insurance to low-income households is their lack of understanding of insurance schemes (McCord 2001) . More educated households have been found to be the ones which are more likely to take up insurance (Chankova et al. 2008 , Giné et al. 2008 . Overcoming this constraint requires a dual effort, targeted at low-educated and illiterate individuals, to improve communication and financial education on risk-pooling, insurance and the rights of policy holders on the one hand, while simplifying policies on the other (McCord 2001) .
The exposure to shocks has an impact on the uptake of financial services, but it depends on the type of risk (Essay 1, Section 1.7, Essay 2, Section 2.7). Moreover, an important role in insurance participation is the trust of the client in the providing institution (Cole et al. 2009 ). For customer retention, it is important that the insurer proves trust along two dimensions: first, that the insurer is willing to make payments to clients, and second, that the insurer is able to deliver the payments (Radermacher et al. 2006) . However, there is so far little systematic knowledge about instruments and mechanisms for building trust (Schneider 2005) . In an environment where a product is new and not well understood, it seems plausible that households will draw inferences based on their degree of experience and familiarity with the insurance providing institution. These inferences may be closely linked to the household's ability to rely on information gleaned from social networks, such as other trusted households which purchase insurance.
As noted above, households may differ in their ability to understand an insurance product, for instance life insurance, as well as in their willingness to experiment with it 73 . Therefore, we assume that younger and more educated household heads are more likely to understand such a product more easily, and to be more likely to participate in such schemes than their older and less educated counterparts. Dror et al. (2007) find that there is a higher level of nominal willingness to pay for micro health insurance compared to the findings of previous studies, and that household income and nominal willingness to pay for insurance are positively correlated (while household's income and willingness to pay as a percentage of household income are negatively correlated). It is im-
73
The ability to understand insurance concepts is not only limited to lower educated households, even well educated individuals find it hard to understand complex products as most insurers do not try to clarify or simplify the product details and the functioning of insurance. We are grateful to an an, but tend to obfuscate, use fine print and protect themselves.
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access portant to note that household size is the most important determinant of willingness to pay for micro health insurance (Dror et al. 2007 ). In sum, we expect a positive relationship between the willingness to pay for micro life insurance in low-income households with their level of income and education, household size, understanding of the insurance concept and trust in the providing tion, but a negative one with the degree of risk aversion.
Data and Methodology
Data
The data for the analysis in this paper comes from a household survey conducted from May to July in 2008 in various villages covering all districts and regions in Sri Lanka 74 . In total, 330 households were interviewed, including two strata of (micro)insured and non-insured households. All households within each stratum were chosen through random sampling. Out of these households, 240 households have bought and 90 have not bought any insurance. The providers surveyed offer insurance in various stylized forms for different types of risk to which households may be exposed in the future 75 . It is important to note that -although we focus on life insurance -there are major differences between life insurance and other insurance types like health, property or crop insurance. Detailed sections on demographic and socioeconomic household characteristics, household assets, the occurrence of shocks, risk management strategies, and the evaluation of a household's subjective perception of its risk exposure and situation, were included in the survey questionnaire, which emphasized the household's integration in financial markets and its participation in loans and savings products, in particular life insurance.
Five different MFIs, namely the WDF, the WDBF, SANASA, YASIRU and SEEDS had been identified in advance as the main providers of voluntary 76 microinsurance for low-income households in Sri Lanka and these were used to select the insured households (see Table 3 .1). The number of total households -74 The survey was conceived in the context of a research project on the demand for microinsurance among low-income households in Sri Lanka. 75 In the household data set, there are eight different insurance types: (1) health insurance, (2) life insurance, (3) other life-cycle event insurance, (4) vehicle insurance, (5) old age annuities/pension, (6) credit insurance, (7) crop insurance and (8) property insurance. 76 The participating institutions provide credit life insurance as well, which is compulsory for the uptake of a loan or other financial product. Yet, these credit insurances are not considered in this study and the respective observations have been dropped from the data set.
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access insured and non-insured -selected from the villages which were linked to the outreach of one of the five institutions differs; in total, only 40 households -insured and non-insured -were linked to the villages and districts where the WDF operates (i.e. Hambantota), while 95 households were associated with the outreach area of SEEDS, as SEEDS operates in all districts in the country. 65 households were related to the coverage areas of the other three institutions (i.e. YASIRU, the WDBF and SANASA). The survey sampling frame is a census of households across 30 villages covering all 14 districts in which these MFIs operate in Sri Lanka. From each district, two or three MFIs have been selected, except for the districts Vavuniya and Batticaloa, located in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where only SEEDS is present. The selected number of insured and non-insured households from each district varied from 15 to 50.
We used the client bases of the five MFIs to randomly select the households for the insured strata. The chosen number of households covered by each institution were randomly spread across the districts in which they operate. In consultation with the district branch managers and respective staff members, we selected two or three villages for each district, representing the respective MFIs in the district, so that access to a high density of insured households could be ensured. From each village, 10 to 15 insured and non-insured households were covered. As we included 30 villages in total all over Sri Lanka, we assume our results to be representative for all villages in Sri Lanka at least, in which microinsurance is accessible via the selected MFIs. The selected villages may be seen as typical villages in rural and semi-urban areas in Sri Lanka. The livelihood activities of most of the households in these villages are agriculture activities, fishery, craft and related works, work as plant and machine operators and assemblers, and other forms of basic or low-skilled occupation, so that the nature of the livelihood activities may be seen as another reason for a household's vulnerability. Therefore, our results might be replicable in any other village in Sri Lanka, besides large cities or remote areas with limited access to microfinance, so that the generalisation might have greater applicability, even though external validity is not fully secured.
We did not select the non-insured clients directly from the client base of the MFIs. The non-insured had to be randomly picked from lists of households from existing CBOs, which are not exclusively associated with any of the five MFIs, in the villages, because of limited financial resources for the survey. For each village one CBO was picked randomly from a list of existing CBOs created with the help of the branch manager and the staff members of the MFIs in the district.
In our estimations we use "purchased life insurance" or "premium amount of purchased life insurance" as the dependent variables and estimate probit regressions 77 , using sampling weights to control for varying sampling probabilities 78 . All analyses were performed in Intercooled Stata 10.0. Table C . 1 (in Appendix C) shows the definition and specific details of each variable's construction expressed as an independent variable 79 . We calculated variance inflation factors (VIFs) to test for possible collinearity among independent variables, but found no substantial concerns 80 . In the estimations, the vector of explanatory variables includes different household characteristics, including demographic and wealth variables such as bequest motives, education, economic activities of the household head, the distance to a road as an access to market indicator, information about remittances, a self perception index of risk 77 The probit regressions are estimated by using the STATA survey data command svy. 78 The weights of the insured strata are computed as the relation between the insured households surveyed and the total number of insured clients for each of the five MFIs (see Table 3 .1). The weights of the non-insured strata cannot be calculated in an analogous manner, as SANASA and YASIRU are exclusive insurers. Therefore, due to the missing information on the total number of non-insured households, we use the listed non-insured households from the CBOs in the villages as representatives of the total non-insured households surveyed. By doing so, the weighted statistics used as sampling weights do not reflect the total population of all 30 villages surveyed. Therefore, the client bases of all five MFIs surveyed plus the total of non-insured households listed by the respective CBOs represents the underlying population of our estimations. 79 To test for potential problems of multicollinearity, we computed the pairwise correlations between the explanatory variables. For the correlation matrix of the explanatory variables, we see no reason for concern. 80 We calculated the variance inflation factors using the collin command in Stata. Except for the regressors "age" and "age squared", all VIFs were less than 4.2, so that we see no reason for concern.
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Method
There are two ways to specify the econometric model for a household's decision to purchase insurance and its respective coverage including the premium amount. First, it can be modelled as a discrete choice via a probit model, so we estimate as follows:
where the binary variable i Y takes the value of 1 if the household participates in micro life insurance, and 0 otherwise, and i X refers to the households and respective individual characteristics of the policy holder in our sample.
Second, and more important for the specification of our model, is the fact that a large part of the households surveyed does not purchase insurance, so that the distribution of life insurance premium amount is a mixture of discrete and continuous distribution. There are a variety of models that are able to account for this combined form of distribution. One option is to use a two-part selection model where we first estimate the insurance participation decision using a probit model and subsequently the decision of insurance coverage, i.e. how much to insure using ordinary least squares (OLS), with a sample correction bias term (Heckman 1990) . This type of model has the advantage of allowing the likelihood of insurance participation to be determined by variables different from the ones driving the fraction of income paid as insurance premium amount. However, the results of such models are often sensitive to identification exclusions, because it is difficult to identify variables that affect the decision of insurance participation, while not also influencing the insurance coverage. We calculate such models, but find that they are inappropriate, as the sample correction bias term is not significantly different from zero 82 .
81 The index is constructed from four questions related to the household's self-perception of its exposure to risks. See for more details, Essay 2, Section 2.5 and Table B . 2 (in Appendix B). 82 Besides, the estimates and the levels of significance are different from the one-stage regressions.
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access Therefore, we assume that a household's life insurance participation decision is a one-stage process and estimate a tobit maximum likelihood 83 , as Equation (2) Y is the income fraction which is paid for insurance coverage to the micro life insurance provider, and i X is the vector of explanatory variables. A one-stage process is correct if the household simultaneously decides to purchase insurance depending on what amount of premium the household is able to pay to be covered under the insurance scheme. The likelihood of life insurance uptake and the decision for the insurance coverage shown by the prepremium amount paid are closely related, and the appropriateness of a tobit model 84 is examined by comparing the signs and magnitudes of explanatory variables that are significantly different from zero to those in the probit model (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo 2006). However, it is difficult to conceive of variables that can identify a household's insurance participation decision, without identifying the amount of the insurance premium.
Findings
Descriptive Statistics
In relation to the dependent variables we present summary statistics for the sample in Table 3 .2, divided into the means of each explanatory variable for the full sample, for life insurance buyers and non-buyers 85 . The data set in general and especially the demographic and wealth data confirm that the sample consists of poor and middle-income households. Insurance buyers in general as well as life insurance buyers have a significantly higher asset endowment than non-buyers, so that life insurance buyers are generally better off households in the communities surveyed. Around 20 percent of the household heads have no 83 An OLS regression would here result in biased and inconsistent estimates, since life insurance premiums are left-censored at zero (Greene 2003). We estimate life insurance premiums with OLS and find that the estimates and the levels of significance of the estimates are different or respectively lower than in the probit and tobit models. 84 We do not have sufficient statistics that allow for unobserved heterogeneity to be conditional out of the cumulative distribution function, and, thus, the tobit model can only be estimated using random effects.
85
The summary statistics for insurance buyers and non-buyers are presented in Table C . 2 (in Appendix C).
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access formal education or only primary education, whereas 40 percent of household heads surveyed have secondary education. There are distinct differences between the characteristics of buyers and nonbuyers of life insurance. On average, we find that life insurance buyers have significantly more dependents, namely children and old dependents, within their households than non-life insurance buyers. A higher share of household heads with life insurance is married compared to their non-insured counterparts. Moreover, the variable age of household heads shows that the age of household heads who purchase a life insurance policy is significantly higher than the age of household heads who do not. The share of Buddhist and Hindu households is higher among the non-insured as compared to the insured households. The buyers of life insurance report higher self-perception of risk scores than the households in the non-buyers category. This may indicate that life insurance buyers perceive themselves as being more highly exposed to risks than their non-life insured counterparts, thus indicating a higher degree of risk aversion. The "household's self-perception of risks" variable is negatively correlated with the socioeconomic status of the household, i.e. the asset endowment. This could imply that the degree of risk aversion decreases with the rising asset endowment of the household.
We asked each household head who purchased any insurance to provide the main reason for their decision for insurance uptake. Table 3 .3 presents the frequencies and percentages for the main reason cited by households for taking up insurance, and especially for life insurance uptake. In the case of insurance uptake, households emphasize the security and especially the risk-reducing effects of insurance. "To secure against future shocks" is the most common and "To protect my family in case of illness/death" the third most self-reported reason. Responses also display other main reasons for insurance uptake, which are not related to risk-reducing benefits, such as "Other", "To obtain collateral for a loan" and "For investment". These categories represent investment and income generating motives underlying the households' decisions to purchase insurance. "Good experiences among relatives and friends" plays only a minor role, indicating the greater importance of security and risk-reducing effects than those of the embedding in social networks such as recommendations from neighbours.
The most popular reason among life insurance purchasers is "To secure against future shocks", followed by "To protect family in case of illness/death". In addition, 6.5% of the households report that they purchased life insurance to cover funeral expenses. Representing more than three quarter of the households' self-reported explanations for life insurance uptake, these responses emphasize the capacity of life insurance to reduce risk and promote security as an ex ante risk coping mechanism. Investment motives are more important, while income generating motives, such as "To obtain collateral for a loan", are reported as less so, for life insurance purchase as compared to the overall insur-ance purchase mentioned above. It appears that social network and learning effects can be neglected as significant factors in a household's self-reported explanation for life insurance purchase. 86 Households surveyed who had purchased any type of insurance were asked to name the main reason for contracting insurance. There are several households who purchased more than one insurance policy, so the frequencies below show the main reason for each policy purchased by the household. Responses were classified into the categories listed in the table. The non-insured households were not asked to name the reasons for not buying insurance.
As we only ask for the main reason for a household's decision to purchase insurance, social network and learning effects may also play a key role in insurance and life insurance uptake, but are not seen as the main reason for it.
Many of these qualitative responses match well with the theoretical models of life insurance participation and their hypotheses, for instance the degree of risk-reduction and of basis risk. However, two reported explanations are inconsistent with theoretical propositions. First, a significant proportion of insurance purchasers cite investment motives as the main reason for insurance uptake. Second, the results indicate that a significant proportion of households purchase insurance only as collateral in order to receive a loan from the respective MFI.
Multivariate Analysis of Micro Life Insurance Participation
The estimates of the probit regression model of micro life insurance participation are presented in Table 3 .4 87 , where the coefficients are normalized to reflect the marginal effect of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability of life insurance uptake 88 . Additionally, we use the fractions of income paid for life insurance, i.e. the premium amount, in absolute terms, and after a lognormal 89 transformation, as dependent variables for the estimation of the insurance coverage in two specifications of a tobit model (Table 3.5) 90 . We add further specifications of covariates in Table 3 .6 including one specification using the number of dependents instead of the differentiation between young and old dependents, one specification with young dependents only, and one with asset quintiles instead of the asset endowment index. Furthermore, we argue that several household heads without life insurance are older in age, so that either 87 Any causality of the estimation outcomes due to the inability to control for heterogeneity or potential reverse causal relationships is treated cautiously. It is important to note that our findings include potential endogeneity problems, as omitted explanatory or third factor variables also influence the outcomes and explanations shown here. Further, we estimate as well a probit regression model on insurance participation: see the results in Table C . 3 (in Appendix C). 88 We calculated the marginal effects for the probit estimation using the margeff command in Stata (Bartus 2005). Average marginal effects and standard errors for marginal effects are calculated using the delta method. 89 The tobit model relies on normality, but respective data are often better modelled as lognormal (Cameron and Trivedi 2009: 531) . Therefore, we apply a lognormal transformation to the dependent variable to increase compatibility with a tobit estimation. 90 All coefficients are normalized to reflect the marginal effect of a one-unit change in the explanatory variable on the probability of life insurance uptake.
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access they are no longer applicable for the purchase of a micro life insurance, or the insurance has already been cashed out due to maturity. In order to test whether that fact has a significant impact on the regressions result, we present estimation outputs for all ages and for a subsample of household heads less than 65 years of age. Whenever necessary, we consider differing results of these samples. Regarding the proxies for a possible bequest motive discussed earlier, we find very clear support for the hypothesis of the benchmark model, namely that micro life insurance participation is positively associated with a higher number of young dependents in the household (Table 3 .4). This turns out to be an economically and statistically significant predictor, indicating an intended bequest motive in micro life insurance participation, which can be altruistic (Tomes 1982) , strategic (Bernheim 1991) or even, indeed, unintended, due to precautionary motives, i.e. uncertain lifetime or imperfect insurance markets (VidalMeliá and Lejárraga-Garcia 2005) .
The majority of micro life insurances in our survey data stress the mortality coverage, which offers benefits for the beneficiaries left behind, i.e. the spouse and the children, and provides only savings or investment options as additional or voluntary components. Therefore, we argue that a policy holder contracts micro life insurance to secure its beneficiaries for the consequences of his/her premature death; this represents an intended bequest motive. In fact, we also find in the other specifications (Table 3 .6) of the probit model and for the life insurance consumption in both tobit regression models (Table 3 .5), that the probability of purchasing micro life insurance and the extent of life insurance coverage increases with an increased number of children. The same is true for the number of all dependents, which is statistically significant for the subsample of household heads under age 65.
We find, in line with the expectations from the benchmark model, that a household with a higher number of old dependents is marginally less likely to take up micro life insurance and to pay larger sums of micro life insurance premiums, but the outcome is not statistically significant. The marriage status of the head is positively associated with micro life insurance participation and life insurance premiums, giving the impression that these are held for bequest motives, but none of the outcomes is statistically significant. Source: Authors' Calculation. Note: For the probit model coefficients are normalized to display marginal effects (MEs). Regression also includes regional dummy variables (outcome omitted). * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.
We find, in contrast to the model's prediction, that households who perceived themselves as being more exposed to risk, are less likely to take up life insurance and are negatively related to life insurance coverage, but the value of the marginal effect is lower compared to the uptake of any form of insurance at all and is not statistically significant (Table C. 3 in Appendix C) 91 . Our deviating result might be due to a marginally higher willingness to pay for life insurance of the poor, as they are the most risk averse households due to their high risk exposure (Ray 1999). As the insured are better off than the noninsured in our data set, we suggest that the self-perception of risk exposure of the insured may be higher due to a lower asset endowment, as compared to the non-insured. Therefore, the poor are less able to afford the life insurance premiums and so have no access to the life insurance market.
In terms of religious inclination, our results suggest that household heads who are Hindu or Buddhist are less likely to use life insurance and less able to pay life premiums than Christian household heads, although the results are only statistically significant for the Hindu heads. In fact, life insurance coverage, i.e. the premium amounts, are negatively associated with Hindu headship of a household. We suggest that religious inclination may affect the individual's risk aversion and their attitude towards the institutional arrangements of insurance, especially life insurance. It is important to note that the Hindu households mainly belong to the Ethnic Tamil of Sri Lankan origin, who are mainly located in the Northern and North-Eastern provinces of Sri Lanka. Therefore, the estimated relationship between Hindu headship and micro life insurance participation may also be related to ethnic affiliation. This could imply that, in our sample, it is especially Hindu household heads from the Ethnic Tamil group who are more risk averse or have lower trust in the insurance providing institutions and therefore are less likely to participate in an insurance scheme. However, our results indicate that the access to life insurance may be limited in this case for this group due to discrimination for religious or ethnic reasons by the providing institutions, voluntary self-exclusion for religious reasons or a lower outreach of the MFIs in the Northern regions.
Contrary to the prediction of the Lewis model, but in line with expectations from the contributions on insurance participation in developing countries, we find that households with a higher asset endowment are significantly positively associated with life insurance uptake and its respective coverage (Table 3.5) 92 . The same is true for households who own land. In respect to the five asset quintiles which evaluate a household's relative wealth status rank in terms of asset endowment, we find that participation decreases with financial wealth status. The households in the three poorest quintiles are significantly negatively related to micro life insurance participation (Table 3 .6) and premium amount. It appears that better off households are less likely to be excluded from the formal insurance, particularly the micro life insurance, market in Sri Lanka. This suggests that the poor have a limited ability to pay the demanded premium amounts for existing micro life insurance schemes.
Furthermore, better off households may have a greater ability to generate income, so that the probability of purchasing life insurance increases with households' income levels. However, it seems plausible that the poor have a lower access to the micro life insurance market than their better off counterparts (Hulme and Mosley 1997 , Navajas et al. 2002 , Datta 2004 , which may be for voluntary or involuntary reasons. Nevertheless, it seems rather unlikely that the poor voluntarily choose not to use micro life insurance.
Our results suggest that household heads with no formal education, or only primary or secondary level, are more likely to use life insurance and to have higher insurance coverage than heads with tertiary education. We find that household heads participating in micro life insurance tend to have lower educational attainment. It seems that households with higher education may neglect micro life insurance participation due to better access to commercial life insurances beyond the microfinance market, reflecting their higher income earning streams. It might be a fact that households with lower educational attainment are especially addressed by micro life insurance providers as the typical microfinance target group, due to their lower and irregular income earning streams. Nevertheless, Lewis (1989) suggests that a higher level of education may increase an individual's risk aversion (Lewis 1989) , which might be another explanation for our deviating result. In summary, our outcomes are in contrast to some of the earlier literature, which finds no significant relationship between education and the uptake of insurance, but which additionally controls for financial literacy (Giné et al. 2008 , Cole et al. 2009 ). To understand whether limited financial education about the product limits the participation, it would be necessary to provide additional information on factors related to financial literacy. 92 The same uptake effect is estimated for uptake of any insurance (Table C. 3 in Appendix C).
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In the following, we emphasize other control variables of the household's decision for life insurance uptake, and of its coverage, which are statistically significant. The likelihood of owning a micro life insurance policy depends in a non-linear way on age, while the age coefficients capture both life cycle and cohort effects. For all empirical evidence reported in this paper, we note that age and cohort effects cannot be separately identified, as we use just a single cross-section of data. In the probit and the tobit regressions with lognormal transformation, we find that the age of the household head is significantly related to life insurance participation and coverage.
In contrast to our expectations, there is no life-cycle effect for life insurance, as participation decreases with age 93 . We argue that, with increasing age, household heads request less life insurance, but from the turning point onwards they request more. One explanation might be that life insurance participation and respective premium amounts are lower for middle aged than for young people. In contrast to the developed country context we suggest that middle aged households are more likely to hold a life insurance policy and with higher face value than their young counterparts (Walliser and Winter 1998). Further, it appears a hump shape of life insurance policy holding, reflecting the change in income over the life cycle, the increase in the number of insurance holders between ages 20 and 40, and the tendency to cash out insurance policies in old age with concomitant lower premium payments. Such a hump shape of life insurance policy holding and also the associated change in income over the life cycle can be rejected for the micro life insurance market in Sri Lanka.
It may be the case that household heads hold less life insurance until middle age, as they are less well educated, less able to understand life insurance and have lower experience with insurance than their younger counterparts. Yet, household heads older than middle age are more likely to request life insurance, due to a higher incentive to protect their family against their premature death, due to their advanced age. However, household heads close to old age -seen as high risk groups by insurers -are also more likely to have limited access to the life insurance market.
Nearly all specifications show that household heads, whether self-employed or contractual workers, are significantly positively associated with micro life insurance participation and its respective insurance coverage. This is possibly due to the fact that micro life insurers and all MFIs in Sri Lanka especially target the self-employed, such as small-scale farmers, even though their activities are mainly associated with lower and more irregular income earning streams.
Beyond this, we control for the incidence of three types of risks, namely for death, illness of a household member -identified as the most severe hazards in 93 The turning point for life insurance participation is 48 years of age in the probit and 60 years of age in the tobit lognormal model.
Mirko Bendig -9783653016413 Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/03/2019 10:26:03PM via free access demand research -and for the experience of any other severe hazard beside these two. Only the experience of another kind of (catastrophic) event appears to be statistically significant, but negatively associated with the participation in and coverage of micro life insurance. This indicates that, after the occurrence of a severe peril, the household is less able to purchase life insurance or extend insurance coverage than without such experience. Possibly, the poor have lower abilities to afford the premiums of a micro life insurance policy after the occurrence of such shock, as they need their financial resources to cover the cost of the peril, income losses and consumption smoothing. Therefore, their access to micro life insurance may be limited. However, we argue that in this case households prefer other risk coping mechanisms, which are more appropriate after the experience of a shock than insurance -namely loans -to cover the direct costs and losses of such an event, so that micro life insurance seems to be substituted by other formally or informally provided risk management strategies.
Conclusion
The take up rates of microinsurance are still low, whereas the participation in micro life insurance is the highest among the microinsurance products offered. Therefore, it is the objective of this paper to shed more light on the rarely discussed estimates of households' micro life insurance participation in developing countries. Focussing on bequest motives, we primarily evaluate participation patterns and the extent of insurance coverage against a theoretical benchmark model developed by Lewis (1989) . We find evidence confirming the model's predictions, but as well results which deviates from the propositions of the model. The study is limited to a single cross section, as it encounters problems in detecting long-term effects. Further research should focus on collecting longitudinal data or conducting randomized experiments to control for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity bias. Using household survey data from Sri Lanka, it appears that correlates of intentional bequest motives (number of young dependents and/or number of dependents) are positively associated with micro life insurance participation, for protection reasons. We view this finding as very strong evidence for the hypothesis that micro life insurance is purchased by low-income households for bequest motives, whereas depending beneficiaries buy micro life insurance to be secure in the event of the premature death of the main breadwinner. Emphasizing the insurance coverage, a tobit model that corrects for the censoring of life insurance premium amounts finds strong effects of the number of children on micro life insurance participation.
In line with empirical findings in the literature, we find that better off households are more likely to participate in a micro life insurance scheme and to pay the respectively small premium sums than their poorer counterparts in Sri Lanka. This supports previous contributions, which suggest that premium payments, even when small, can be unaffordable to many households. It is likely that the amount of the premium becomes a major barrier to any micro life insurance product enrolment, so that the poor may be rationed out of the market altogether. Even though the poor have high incentives to secure against future shocks, their access is still limited. However, in practice most micro life insurers do not have the capacity to extend their provision in the short term, so that one possible solution is for the government to promote the financial and technical assistance for capacity building in the existing MFIs. Furthermore, to improve the social performance of microfinance, it is essential to integrate social performance management, not only as a separate concept, but as an overall performance management in MFIs to target more efficiently the "social bottom line".
However, household heads participating in the micro life insurance schemes tend to have lower educational attainment, while households with higher education have higher access to commercial life insurance schemes, a higher individual risk aversion in respect of their higher educational attainment (Lewis 1989) and typically do not belong to the microfinance target group. Household heads who are self-employed or contractual workers, forming one typical target group, are positively related to micro life insurance participation and related insurance coverage. Deviating from the theoretical model, we find no life-cycle effect for micro life insurance. Until middle age, household heads hold fewer micro life insurance policies, as they seem to be less educated, less able to understand and have less experience with insurance products and markets than their younger counterparts in Sri Lanka.
Interestingly, we find indicative evidence that religious inclination is associated with the participation in micro life insurance schemes in Sri Lanka. Hindu household heads who are mainly affiliated with the Ethnic Tamil group of Sri Lanka origin, are negatively associated with the uptake of micro life insurance. On the one hand, religious inclination may affect the individual's risk aversion, attitude towards life insurance and trust in the provider. On the other hand, religious beliefs in particular may influence a household's attitude towards the afterlife, which may hinder the probability of participating in micro life insurance and lead to voluntary self-exclusion of the poor for religious reasons. It is also plausible that certain religious or ethnic groups have no or only limited access to micro life insurance due to discrimination by the providing in-stitutions, the employed staff or a lower microfinance outreach in their tial area.
Most notably, the government's and donor's support of micro life insurance participation is important in order to serve low-income groups with preventive risk coping strategies. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize these intentional bequest motives in the marketing measures of such insurance schemes and avoid mixing these with investment motives or misleading offers, such as the promise to use insurance as collateral for loans. From a generic perspective, the government and the microfinance sector has first to take the challenge to improve a household's knowledge about life insurance, so that the poor are more aware about possible life insurance offers and are then more likely to purchase micro life insurance.
Another key factor is building trust in the providers by offering simple, affordable and easily understandable micro life insurance policies. Insurance managers need to promote insurance to potential members, not only using marketing events, but also financial education, especially insurance related seminars. In addition, it may help to address self-exclusion and combat discrimination due to religious beliefs, ethnic affilitation or old age, by improving financial education on insurance and the understanding of the benefits of insurance among such groups before contracting insurance.
